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Summary 
 
This article analyses the operation of European works councils (EWCs) in three multinational 
companies (GSK, Coca-Cola and UniCredit) across six EU Member States (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Ireland, Italy and the UK). Based on interviews with EWC members and other employee 
representatives in these companies, it argues that EWCs are in a process of continual development, 
and examines the influences on their effectiveness by using a fivefold typology: company type, path 
dependency, socio-institutional environments, actors’ strategies and internal EWC dynamics. The 
article reveals that our respondents refer most frequently to the internal dynamics of EWCs as the 
key influence on their effectiveness, and concludes by assessing the policy implications for trade 
unions. 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the adoption of the European Works Councils Directive in 1994, European works councils 
(EWCs) have become a key feature in the debate about the Europeanization of industrial 
relations. The EWC Directive ‘set out requirements for informing and consulting employees in 
undertakings or groups of undertakings with at least 1 000 employees across the member states 
of the European Economic Area (EEA) and at least 150 employees in each of two or more of 
those member states’ (Cressey, 2009: 141). The total number of EWCs has reached 1 258, of 
which 1 029 are currently in existence across 955 eligible multinational companies (MNCs) 
(ETUI database, 2013). Moreover, following the adoption of the Directives providing for worker 
involvement in the European Company (2001) and in the European Cooperative Society (2003), 
the adoption of the European Works Council Directive (recast) in 2009 has helped to refine the 
operation of EWCs, for example by clarifying definitions of ‘information’ and ‘consultation’, 
improving their integration into other union and employee representative structures, and 
ensuring access to experts when necessary (Jagodziński, 2009). Though the consequences of the 
recast Directive require further research, EWCs have already been playing a critically important 
role in the transnationalization of industrial relations and the improvement of worker rights for 
around 20 years. 
The literature analysing the growth, impact and significance of EWCs has burgeoned, 
based to a large extent on the accumulation of case study findings. Much of this research has 
been small-scale, based occasionally on up to 15 case studies (Lecher et al., 2001), but generally 
on between one and eight (see, for example, Hann, 2010; Huzzard and Docherty, 2005; Wills, 
2000). 
An important question is whether this accumulation of case study material has led to 
any advance in theoretical understanding of the conditions under which EWCs perish, stagnate 
or flourish: indeed, are EWCs a success or a failure? (Jagodziński, 2011). Clearly, this question, 
as Jagodziński argues, is too crude as such. EWCs vary greatly in scope and practice and may 
succeed according to some criteria yet fail according to others. The picture is more patchy than 
an ‘either/or’ formulation would suggest. The key issue, rather, is to identify those factors that 
promote or hinder the effectiveness of EWCs. Such an identification may allow unions better to 
target their efforts and resources when planning policy towards EWCs, a point we explore at the 
end of this article. 
One group of researchers (Hertwig et al., 2011), basing their conclusions on a review of the 
literature, has advanced the following fivefold typology of the diverse influences on the 
effectiveness of EWCs: 
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 company type (structure and coordination, such as degree of integration); 
 trajectory or path dependency (corporate history and circumstances of the foundation 
and evolution of the EWC); 
 socio-institutional environments (institutional, legal and cultural contexts); 
 actors’ strategies (role of managers and unions as agents); and 
 internal dynamics (relationships amongst EWC members and other union and employee 
representatives). 
 
This breakdown of influences is compatible with one of the conclusions of a recent extensive 
empirical survey of EWCs – that an EWC is ‘an institution in process’ (Waddington, 2011: 21), 
meaning that it has no end point and is in a state of continuous development. The term ‘in 
process’ emphasises that EWCs evolve along a number of dimensions, for example trust 
amongst representatives, deepening objectives and strengthening relationships with other 
labour organizations (Waddington, 2011: 211). Such an approach also helps to explain the 
circumstances in which, at best, EWCs have managed to create their own ‘labour identities’ 
which transcend national interests to form an overarching, European labour interest (Whittall 
et al., 2007). 
This approach, which places the dynamism of EWCs at the heart of the analysis, has 
three consequences. Firstly, it casts doubt on the usefulness of pigeon-holing EWCs as, for 
example, symbolic, service-oriented, project-oriented or participative (Lecher et al., 2001), 
which emphasizes their static and unchanging qualities rather than their dynamic qualities. 
Secondly, it helps to shift debate away from the Euro-optimist/Euro-pessimist polarity, which 
has characterized much research until now (Cressey, 2009). Each ‘side’ has tended to focus on a 
limited range of criteria for evaluating EWCs – for example, the Euro-optimists have stressed 
their potential, particularly for training and networking, while the Euro-pessimists have 
emphasized concerns over the possible erosion of national labour standards and the lack of 
union capacity to support their activity (Waddington, 2011: 212–219). A more ‘process-based’ 
approach, which examines the trajectory of individual EWCs in an attempt to build up a nuanced 
understanding of the influences at work, helps to explain their complexities and dynamics in 
greater depth. 
Thirdly, a focus on process helps to clarify the issues involved in the ‘reflexive approach’ 
towards the negotiation of EWCs, tailored to individual company structures and requirements, 
adopted in the Directive. The EWC Directive, along with the Directives on the European 
Company Statute (2001) and information and consultation of employees (2002), promotes the 
flexible introduction of employee participation by requiring employers and employee 
representatives at company level to negotiate customized arrangements, in the ‘shadow’ of the 
imposition of statutory fall-back procedures in case of failure to agree. ‘Reflexive’ law therefore 
establishes a framework for negotiation within which outcomes will vary according to the 
resources and power relationships of the parties concerned (Barnard and Deakin, 2000; 
Koukiadaki, 2009). It also focuses on ‘process’, but at the formation stage of the EWC. While 
reflexive law moulds the contours of the EWC as an institution – its structure, membership, 
rights, frequency of meetings and so on – a broader process-based approach can be used to 
examine its subsequent operation and effectiveness. 
Our article contributes to this literature on process – the focus on the influences that 
mould and develop EWCs – by examining three case studies, each one a major multinational 
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company operating across a range of countries that generally feature less frequently in the 
literature. 
 
Methods 
 
The INFORMIA II project, on whose findings this article is based, analysed the role of EWCs 
within eight MNCs operating across six EU Member States: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, 
Italy and the UK (though at the time of the research in 2011/12 Croatia was still an accession 
country). The focus of the research was driven largely by the findings of the previous INFORMIA 
I project which had analysed workplace information and consultation systems in Bulgaria, 
Croatia, France, Ireland and Italy (Ribarova, 2011). These suggested that the scope of 
representation and the impact of information and consultation procedures tend to depend on 
the quality of information shared by employers, as well as on the ability of individual 
representatives to obtain and use this information. INFORMIA II aimed to explore these points 
in more detail by investigating various aspects of the operation of EWCs, including the principal 
influences on their internal dynamics. 
Case studies were conducted in eight MNCs across four sectors (chemicals/ 
pharmaceuticals, food and drink, financial services and hospitality). From 
chemicals/pharmaceuticals, two main case studies were prepared: GlaxoSmithKline 
(subsidiaries in Ireland and the UK) and Solvay (subsidiary in Bulgaria). From soft drinks, the 
case of Coca-Cola HBC involved subsidiaries from Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Italy and Ireland. 
Financial services focused on UniCredit Group subsidiaries in Bulgaria, Croatia, Italy and the UK; 
Société Générale and Popular Bank in Cyprus; and Aviva in Ireland. There was only one case 
study in the hospitality sector, the Hilton Hotel in Cyprus. That case, along with the other single-
country case studies (Aviva, Popular Bank, Société Générale and Solvay), have been excluded 
from this analysis on the grounds of their limited nature. This article is therefore based on GSK, 
Coca-Cola and UniCredit. 
All the researchers, apart from the current authors, work for trade union confederations 
across the countries covered in the project (they are listed in the acknowledgements). Our 
principal interest, therefore, was practical rather than theoretical – we wanted to discover the 
principal factors that influenced the effective operation of EWCs for union policy reasons. 
Although the literature informed our approach, we had no preconceptions about the nature of 
‘process’: our research was inductive and interpretivist – we allowed our respondents to 
express themselves as they wished in semi-structured interviews so that we could understand 
their circumstances and attitudes entirely in their own words. Respondents included 
employers’ representatives, usually human resource (HR) directors, as well as employee 
representatives (EWC members, information and consultation representatives and trade union 
representatives at company and sector level, such as shop stewards, members of executive 
bodies and chairs of sectoral federations and unions). We also gathered economic and statistical 
data about the sectors, as well as information on the state of industrial relations and social 
partnership in the relevant companies.  
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The case studies 
 
GlaxoSmithKline 
 
Headquartered in the UK, GSK is the world’s fifth largest pharmaceuticals company, with offices 
in over 100 countries and major research centres in Belgium, China, Spain, the UK and the USA. 
This case study is based on its operations in the UK and Ireland. GSK is organized into business 
units, and in its Global Manufacturing and Supply unit – where the majority of our UK 
respondents were located – two unions (GMB and Unite) are recognized for bargaining 
purposes. 
There are 33 EWC members (members are from 28 countries, all EU Member States plus 
Norway). About half the total EWC membership is unionized, though the unions are active in a 
number of countries in the election of EWC members. The EWC has an operating sub-committee 
of six members (plus one substitute). This meets five or six times per year, as the company 
prefers to deal with a small group rather than having diverse communication across the full 
EWC membership. The agenda, both for the annual meeting and the operating sub-committee, is 
drawn up by joint chairpersons who determine management’s participation in the meetings. 
Employees do not appear to raise their own issues on the operating sub-committee and tend 
rather to respond to management agendas: ‘we have brought nothing in particular to the table’, 
said one UK interviewee. UK employees tend to raise issues at the UK national forum – the 
national consultative committee – rather than at the EWC. 
The GSK EWC constitution was amended in September 2011 in light of the terms of the 
2009 recast Directive. The EWC now has the right to receive information on takeovers and to 
discuss with their EWC counterparts in the targeted company, if they exist, how to integrate that 
EWC into the GSK EWC. It also has the right to information on, and to discuss with management, 
any restructuring which will impact on one country and the employees in that country. The  
operating sub-committee may request the assistance of an expert, and if management do not 
agree the onus is on management to show that an expert is not necessary. The UK substitute 
member of the operating sub-committee regarded access to an expert as the most significant 
improvement resulting from the recast EWC Directive because ‘EWC reps can’t be expert on 
everything’. Another interviewee stated: ‘We asked for experts in the past, but it fell on deaf 
ears’. GSK were obliged to respond because of the new legislation. 
During the 10 years from 2000 to 2010, GSK had been characterized by ongoing 
reorganization,  and so the EWC’s agenda had been dominated by this background and the need 
to respond to redundancies, site closures, outsourcing, restructuring and technological change. 
Its main aim, as one respondent put it, was ‘to make sure management told the truth’. Since 
2010, the former chair of the EWC believes GSK is becoming a more stable company and the 
EWC would now be able to focus better on the ‘nitty gritty’. He also believed that, while younger 
managers were wary of the unions, they were also increasingly convinced of the benefits of 
consultation, especially as more highly technically qualified staff are given opportunities for 
involvement. 
Heads of business units give presentations on transnational issues at the EWC annual 
meeting, including financial and business reports. Information gets fed back to the business 
units and to the operating sub-committee. According to interviewees, the company’s main 
objectives in organizing the EWC were to ‘satisfy legislation’ and to ‘tick boxes’. ‘They do it to us, 
we are not really involved’, said one. Indeed, the company has not attempted to use the EWC 
proactively to create or project its own identity at a European level. 
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There are certain informal links between EWC members, with emails sent back and 
forth, and the occasional ‘round robin’ circulated, requesting information about what other 
countries do in respect of a particular practice or piece of legislation. Issues have included pay 
negotiations, redundancy policies and employment security. For instance the former EWC chair 
gave specific examples of support on best practice to the Hungarian representative. He also 
maintained that information from the EWC had fed into collective bargaining agendas and, with 
more success, into the national forum agendas, including matters regarding health and safety 
and research and development. 
The employees’ side had requested training on pensions, which had been provided in-
house, but no such request had been made concerning company finances. The Chief Financial 
Officer makes presentations at the national forum and the EWC. The information presented is 
often quite detailed in scope, but according to the interviewees, members tend not to ask 
questions, which might reflect their lack of training. However, the former EWC chair, also a 
member of the EWC operating committee for 10 years, pointed out that training EWC members 
was difficult because of their high turnover, in addition to which Unite and the European Mine, 
Chemical and Energy Workers’ Federation (EMCEF) had given training to union members. 
According to him, members of the operating committee, whose membership is more stable, are 
trained in areas like financial matters. 
The former EWC chair observed that management had learnt to explain to the EWC not 
just their own proposals on a particular issue but also why the alternatives would not work. In 
this way, management tried to pre-empt possible objections that might be raised. On the other 
hand, he felt that the EWC had influenced a variety of matters, including organization of the 
company’s distribution networks, and he gave the EWC an overall rating of ‘six out of ten’. The 
Irish EWC member agreed that, on the whole, the EWC works well, but noted that it is just an 
information forum, although management do actively engage with the operating sub-committee 
on a range of issues and proposals. However, there had been little or no support from the trade 
union movement when he was first elected to the EWC. 
UK business units at GSK, such as its Global Manufacturing and Supply unit, have their 
own websites on which minutes from the national forum and EWC are posted, so everyone can 
see what information has been disclosed. However, interviewees agreed that the company 
‘complied with the legislation but doesn’t go beyond it’. One respondent said ‘We may get small, 
small changes, but otherwise very little’. These views reflected attitudes expressed at all levels 
on which the company provided information and consultation – site, business unit, national and 
EWC. 
 
Coca-Cola 
 
The Coca-Cola Company (TCCC) is a US MNC which manufactures, retails and markets non-
alcoholic beverage concentrates and syrups, with operations in over 200 countries. Regarding 
its European operations, TCCC Europe Group operates as a holding company wholly or partially 
owning two other companies. Coca-Cola Enterprises (CCE) manufactures, bottles and 
distributes the product across Europe, while Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Company (CCHBC) – 
the most important of the three companies from the point of view of the INFORMIA II project, 
with operations in five of the six countries (the exception being the UK) – makes the syrup 
concentrate and is the biggest bottling and distribution company in the group. 
Each of the three companies has its own EWC and their activities are coordinated 
through the European Federation of Trade Unions in Food, Agriculture and Tourism (EFFAT), 
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which also provides expert advice. Indeed, joint meetings with representatives from the three 
EWCs have been organized through EFFAT, with four such meetings held each year. 
The EWC for TCCC comprises members from all countries belonging to the EEA, with the 
exception of smaller countries, such as Luxembourg and Liechtenstein. This EWC now seems to 
have entered a more constructive phase, following a somewhat turbulent period in 2008, when 
trade unions were unhappy with what they considered as management’s unfair conduct in 
relation to a downsizing process in 10 countries across Europe. Management argued that these 
were individual, national restructurings and, consequently, not for discussion with the EWC, 
which raised serious problems from the EWC perspective. The company is in a continuous 
process of restructuring and change and, in general, it is the view of both the TCCC and CCHBC 
EWC members that management is good at sharing information with them. However, a number 
of EWC members argued that management still controls the information flow and, as one put it, 
‘you are never quite sure if you are getting the full picture’. One of the challenges for EWC 
members is that management frequently insists that issues which the EWC would like to discuss 
are national rather than transnational. 
The advantage of the TCCC EWC is that all members are able to communicate in English 
and are familiar with all the technological means that allow them to be in contact at all times. In 
addition, many of them meet for reasons related to the international nature of their work and 
not only for EWC duties. This stimulates information sharing, unlike the situation in other EWCs 
where exchange takes place almost exclusively during EWC meetings, once or twice a year. The 
TCCC EWC members are able not only to circulate their messages but also to push them through 
in a single voice, to the appreciation of the management. 
The CCHBC EWC was established in 2002. The CCHBC Chief Executive Officer (CEO), or 
another senior manager delegated by him, is a member. The workers’ representatives elect five 
of their members from different countries to sit on the standing committee, whose functions 
include agreeing the agenda for meetings, regular contact with management, inviting external 
experts and encouraging the training of EWC members. The EWC meets in plenary session once 
annually, but the standing committee may call additional extraordinary meetings should they be 
considered necessary. Members meet before or after the plenary session to plan for common 
action. In the past two years there have been a number of extra meetings to deal with key issues, 
such as the management proposal to pool services through the Omega Shared Services Centre, 
which threatened redundancies in other countries. The 2012 annual meeting discussed how 
communications with the local/national levels can be improved, in line with the requirements of 
the recast Directive.  
A number of the CCHBC EWC members interviewed said that the EWC provides the 
opportunity to ‘see the big picture’ and is a good source of information, both for unions and for 
management. For example, a new outsourcing policy was presented and discussed with the 
EWC before local management saw it. However there is a view that there is some reluctance on 
the part of Coca-Cola companies to share information and to consult with the EWCs. The EFFAT 
expert maintained: ‘If you go beyond face value, the truth is that companies would willingly 
avoid having to go through all this. They inform you but they don’t actually consult you and the 
information they give is often incomplete, sketchy and late’. Language and interpretation are 
also identified as an issue, in particular when a clear understanding of the topics being 
discussed is needed. This problem has only been partially addressed and the Standing 
Committee has tried to deal with it by arranging language courses for its members. Another 
problem is how to deal with information that management designates as confidential, 
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presenting worker representatives with difficulties in terms of what information can or cannot 
be disclosed to the wider workforce. 
Overall, there is a general view that the Coca-Cola companies are open and forthcoming 
with relevant information at the national and EU levels, but there are concerns that information 
is too closely controlled and filtered by management. There is also a view that the EWCs are a 
key source of information for workers and trade unions, although there were some concerns 
expressed about managements’ control of the information provided to the EWC and the serious 
lack of genuine consultation. While Coca-Cola states its commitment to good employment 
relations, its companies in Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland and Italy (four of the INFORMIA II countries) 
have been involved in serious disputes in recent years, mainly as a result of redundancies, the 
outsourcing of jobs or changes to contractual arrangements. The influence of the EWC on 
management processes and decision-making is minimal in most countries. The links between 
the EWCs and any national information and consultation arrangements have, up until now, not 
been developed, and it is left to the individual EWC members to organize a reporting-back 
procedure. The support of EFFAT and the provision of experts to the three EWCs are therefore 
vital for the functioning of the EWCs and the effective input of employee representatives. 
 
UniCredit 
 
The UniCredit Group is the outcome of a merger involving nine of Italy’s biggest banks, which 
together formed Gruppo UniCredito Italiano in 1998. In 1999, UniCredito Italiano started its 
expansion in central and eastern Europe (CEE) with the acquisition of Bank Pekao in Poland. 
International presence was further boosted with acquisitions in Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Romania, Slovakia and Turkey. In 2005, UniCredit merged with the German banking 
group HVB, which had an existing strong presence in the new Europe, allowing UniCredit to 
strengthen further its European operations. The Group now operates in 22 European countries. 
The initiative to set up the EWC came from the bank. HVB already had an EWC in 
compliance with the 1994 Directive. A key role during the process leading to the Special 
Negotiating Body was played by the bank. As one respondent put it: ‘Against a backdrop of 
improving industrial relations, the bank realised it would make good sense to have someone 
representative to talk to’. The UniCredit European Works Council founding agreement was duly 
signed in January 2007. The EWC covers all the European countries where the bank is present, 
including both EU and non-EU members. According to the agreement, employee representatives 
have the right to timely information and consultation by the Group management on all relevant 
cross-border issues, in particular those which impact on employees. Twice a year the employee 
representatives appointed to the EWC have the opportunity to meet top management (plenary 
ordinary meetings) to be informed and consulted on the Group’s current business situation. 
Subsequently the results of these meetings are disseminated at local level through EWC 
members. A select committee comprising seven employee representatives, in addition to the 
President, represents the EWC as a point of contact with central management. 
During the first part of the ordinary meetings, top management present and explain 
results, future challenges and current projects. In the second part of the day the EWC members 
from three selected CEE countries present an analysis of the current state of industrial relations 
and social dialogue jointly with the respective heads of HR, focusing on expectations and 
priorities for the future, as well as tangible suggestions and initiatives for the company to 
support. A continuous flow of information and interaction between company and employee 
representatives is managed by the ‘Industrial Relations – International’ function, which 
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constantly informs the EWC members about the most relevant Group issues and market 
situation. 
The EWC and the Group have produced two Joint Declarations, one on ‘Training, 
Learning and Professional Development’ and another on ‘Equal Opportunities and Non-
Discrimination’. Although the EWC does not have negotiating rights, these declarations are 
considered by the unions as de facto agreements, even if not named as such. They can be 
considered as transnational company agreements (TCAs), independently from their legal status, 
and guaranteeing their implementation and respect is key for the image of the company. 
Dissemination of the Joint Declarations – for example, through websites, newsletters and 
training material – is considered a fundamental step in raising awareness of their principles, 
creating a common culture and a shared direction. 
One of the EWC select committee members provided an outline of the work carried out 
over recent years. The topics discussed centred on three areas: (1) the training of EWC 
members through participation in workshops focusing on industrial relations, participation and 
social legislation in various countries; (2) reporting on the performance of the Group with a 
special focus on the employment front, especially in eastern European countries; and (3) the 
strengthening of industrial relations at both central and local levels, especially in those 
countries where trade union relations are weakest (such as Poland). As one respondent 
explained: ‘The quality of the people involved is high, and so is the information that is provided 
at the plenary session. But the same cannot be said regarding consultation. Consultation takes 
place at the EWC select committee and deals with issues concerning the country involved’. 
At EWC level, trade union representatives from various countries have the opportunity 
to get to know each other and compare their respective situations. One commented: ‘The work 
of the EWC seems to be quite fruitful not only for the exchange of information with the Group’s 
management, but also for proactive activity to promote, in all countries, social dialogue and 
constructive industrial relations’. Trade union representatives noted the difficulty in 
disseminating TCAs in countries where trade unions are not present, and stressed the need to 
link TCAs with European sectoral social dialogue, referring in particular to the link between the 
UniCredit agreements and the 2002 declaration on lifelong learning in the banking sector. 
The EWC agreement was recast in April 2011. The document was then fully endorsed by 
the whole EWC assembly at the 2011 First Ordinary Meeting. The EWC in its new form (2011– 
2014) has seen the re-formulation of its membership, confirming the 44 EWC members but 
increasing the number of representatives from Hungary, Italy, Russia and Ukraine, and reducing 
the numbers from other countries. The new EWC has already begun with a plenary meeting of  
the select committee. The immediate purpose, according to the Italian delegate, was the signing 
of a Global Framework Agreement setting out certain basic common rights throughout the 
Group, and covering all countries. This would enshrine the case for freedom of union 
association, respect for human rights and dignity in terms of working hours, safety and working 
conditions, employment and skills development, social security, health and insurance coverage. 
Of the three cases, the overall approach of UniCredit towards information and 
consultation can be seen as the most positive. There is the commitment to pursue a socially 
responsible orientation, to disseminate good practice among the Group’s companies across their 
various operations, and to define better the notion of information and consultation in positive 
anticipation of what is contained in the recast Directive. There are also the innovative Joint 
Declarations, which constitute the prerequisite for fully-fledged transnational group 
agreements. There is, in addition, a broadening of the topics covered by the information and 
consultation procedure, beyond those prescribed in the EWC Directive or by Italian law. Two 
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ordinary plenary EWC meetings are held every year, with two additional ones possible should 
extraordinary events arise. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
Application of Hertwig et al.’s (2011) typology of influences on EWC activity is less 
straightforward than it might seem. It is not always easy to establish which element fits into 
which category, and sometimes an element may fit into more than one. For example, EU 
directives and trade union structures could both be viewed as part of the socio-institutional 
environment of EWCs. Hertwig et al. (2011), however, view them as elements in their internal 
dynamics: EU directives because they are legal resources that EWCs can exploit, and trade union 
structures because they influence the EWC’s capacity to organize. That said, it is clear from 
these three case studies that our union respondents generally perceived factors linked to the 
internal dynamics of EWCs to be the most significant in terms of their influence on effectiveness. 
Our respondents barely refer to company type as an issue. This is possibly because the 
structure and integration of the company within which they are working is a given and cannot 
be controlled. The division of Coca-Cola into three separate entities is an issue only insofar as it 
requires an effort, coordinated by EFFAT, to ensure that the three EWCs communicate with one 
another. 
Respondents do refer to path dependency, which they expressed in terms of company 
history and the circumstances in which their EWC was formed. In both GSK and Coca-Cola, for 
example, they mentioned the recent turbulent past of the company and the degree to which the 
EWC had ‘settled’ once a period of major restructuring and internal reorganization had been 
completed. 
The influence of socio-institutional environments emerged in the importance of a shared 
language. For example, while members of the TCCC EWC were all able to communicate in 
English, those on the CCHBC could not, which led to the organization of language courses for 
them by their standing committee. Informal links amongst members of the TCCC EWC were 
more frequent and fruitful as a result. Furthermore, employers and unions interpret 
‘information’ and ‘consultation’ in various ways, depending both on the countries where the 
subsidiaries are located and on the country of origin of the MNCs, even though there are now 
explicit definitions of both in the 2009 recast Directive. These variations reflect management 
practices and styles across the three case studies, which are themselves heavily influenced by 
socio-institutional factors. 
Actors’ strategies also play a major role in respondents’ understanding of influences on 
EWC activity. Management at GSK are seen as having a ‘tick box’ attitude towards the EWC – 
though younger managers are considered more positively – while at Coca-Cola (both TCCC and 
CCHBC) management was regarded as good at sharing information, though the information 
itself was closely controlled. UniCredit management, meanwhile, had generally adopted a 
positive attitude towards the EWC from the outset. In all cases, the executive committee of the 
EWC was pivotal in coordinating cross-border activity: executive committee members were 
more likely to enjoy training opportunities and to be consulted by management (rather than 
being merely informed) than ordinary EWC members. 
However, employee representatives were generally regarded as playing a reactive 
rather than a proactive role on their EWCs. There is no evidence that the worker 
representatives on the bodies analysed here regularly place their own items on the agenda or – 
still less – develop their own alternative policies towards, for example, closures and 
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redundancies. Furthermore, there are some restrictions on freedom of expression, arising from 
fears of management reaction (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus). Such fears may result from the 
interpretation of the provisions on confidentiality of information. In some cases, employers 
insist more strongly than necessary on observance of these provisions, which can frustrate the 
functioning of workers’ representation and the distribution of information. 
The internal dynamics of the EWC – which, for Hertwig et al. (2011), include trade union 
and representative structures as well as EU directives and national legislation – were most 
frequently considered as significant influences on EWC activity. In general, directives and 
legislation are the driving forces for the implementation of information and consultation rights 
in all the countries participating in the project. In all three companies studied, respondents 
referred to the significance of the 2009 recast Directive in stimulating improvements in their 
EWCs. At GSK, for example, they listed a variety of improvements, notably access to experts, 
which they had been denied until the change in the law. 
In each company, there are established structures in which worker representatives 
already participate. Trade unions are well represented on these but, compared with main 
workplace representation structures, there are also cases where trade union representatives, or 
even trade union members, are not directly involved in the EWCs. This could result from the 
striving of some MNC management teams to keep within the law but without trade union 
representation. The UK subsidiary of UniCredit, for example, was non-union, and its 
representative on the EWC was also, accordingly, non-union. 
There was a view that EWCs worked better as a source of information than the 
local/national consultation arrangements in some countries (Ireland, UK), although there were 
some concerns expressed across the three cases too about management control of information 
provided to the national information and consultation structures, and also to the EWCs. In GSK, 
there was evidence that the national forum (the national consultative committee) was operating 
rather more effectively than the EWC because local workers were seen to be more interested in 
their own particular issues than in the issues of other subsidiaries, or of the MNC as a whole. 
Many EWC members in GSK and CCHBC complained that, while the information 
disclosed by management was generally good, consultation was much weaker. However, those 
in UniCredit, an Italian company that had grown under strong German influence, had managed 
to negotiate a couple of transnational collective agreements, on health and safety and equal 
opportunities respectively. 
A further significant aspect of EWC internal dynamics centres on trade union 
engagement. There is clear national variation in union engagement in the process of information 
and consultation and in the work of EWCs in particular. In some cases there is a longstanding 
tradition of workplace trade union and representation structures complementing and 
supporting the whole process in a promising way (Cyprus, Italy). Engagement is average in 
Croatia, tends to be average to low in Bulgaria and Ireland (with even some resistance to the 
new structures), and is comparatively low in the UK (also with some resistance). The isolation 
of trade unions, when it occurs, results from low membership densities, the anti-trade union 
behaviour of employers (whether covert or overt) and their search for mechanisms for 
informing staff without the participation of the trade unions. 
In almost all countries the trade unions prefer either to control the function of 
information and consultation or at least to be well integrated into them and to have substantial 
influence on the process. Usually they see rights to information and consultation primarily as an 
instrument for ensuring respect for workers’ rights contained in other legal sources. This 
applies even in countries like Croatia, even though information and consultation rights there 
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extend beyond EU standards, and a whole section of the Labour Code is even entitled ‘workers’ 
co-determination’. 
 
A way forward? 
 
In this final section, we summarize our respondents’ overall considerations regarding the 
effectiveness of their EWCs and ways to deepen that effectiveness, with consequent implications 
for the development of union policy. Respondents generally agreed that there were many 
benefits of EWCs, including: the strengthening of social dialogue; providing a company-wide 
vehicle for a regular, transparent and timely flow of information; improving employees’ 
understanding of the reasons behind management decisions at group level; diffusing a culture of 
social dialogue within the top levels of management; innovation and change, based on mutual 
understanding and cooperation; and developing a European corporate culture. However, while 
the information and consultation rights and procedures were assessed as relatively useful 
instruments, in general, they are not seen as tools for productive discussions between 
management and workers’ representatives for finding new solutions in fields such as 
productivity and competitiveness, which would be beneficial for both the workers and the 
company, nor as tools for ensuring higher levels of workers’ rights than those granted by 
applicable legal minima. 
Indeed, a serious constraint on the development of EWCs is lack of employee interest, 
not just in reluctance to accept nomination for EWC election but also in their operation. 
Employees appear to be more concerned with issues related directly to their workplace, and 
may not appreciate how European group level activity affects them. Some respondents believed 
that the ongoing financial crisis may also drive employees away from the unions and increase 
mistrust towards them. Furthermore, there is very limited information available on the role of 
EWCs, both at national and European levels, which tends to restrict understanding of their 
function in companies. Information and consultation rights at work are not well understood 
among the public, or even among most workers and employers. This may reflect the relative 
lack of influence in most countries of EWC decisions on collective bargaining, especially in 
Bulgaria, Cyprus and the UK. The situation is much better in Italy, where the structures for 
collective bargaining and for information and consultation in subsidiaries, which generally 
supervise and monitor EWC members, are the same. 
Links between EWCs and national information and consultation arrangements, or with 
the workforce, have until now been very much the responsibility of individual EWC members to 
organize. While it also depends on the integration of information and consultation procedures, 
the role of the individual representative is decisive. Usually links are much better in those 
undertakings where there are trade unions and where the trade unions are stronger. 
Not unexpectedly, all worker representatives interviewed argued that the only way to 
make information and consultation rights more beneficial to workers, and to ensure their 
greater involvement, would be by extending the list of issues on which the employer is obliged 
to inform or consult. This depends very much on the management side and especially on the 
level of their understanding of the importance of the EWC process and on their style and views 
concerning worker rights. However, it was felt that management should be persuaded to do so 
in the interests of both company results and a more participative management style. 
Certain amendments too are required in national legislation, especially with respect to 
the mechanisms for implementing EWC rights. The mechanisms for providing information, the 
definitions of ‘confidentiality’, the qualifications of EWC members and the procedures for 
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electing them could be improved. The role of government institutions in the supervision and 
control of these processes should also be improved, especially in cases where there are either 
no trade unions or they are weak. 
In particular, our respondents believed that unions need to focus on improving the 
preparation of worker representatives, especially reaching out to those who are not trade union 
representatives or members, or who represent workers from a non-union environment. The 
positive role of EWCs should be more strongly promoted among employees and employers as a 
whole. This is a task not only for the social partners – notably national and EU-level trade 
unions and employers’ associations – but also for governments. 
National and sectoral trade unions need to adopt an active stance towards EWCs and 
engage in the process of inclusion and election of EWC members. Otherwise, respondents feared 
that EWCs could be manipulated by local management, citing evidence of reported cases where 
human resource managers, appointed by management, have been sent to participate in the 
work of EWCs as national representatives, especially from the central and eastern European 
countries. However, overall, respondents generally believed that EWCs had great potential and 
that strong union policy was a means to maximize it. 
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